the post was adequately manned. As for Fort Sumter, its situation had been for the past two months becoming daily more and more perilous. The enemy's batteries were constantly increasing in efficiency, and it was now very questionable whether the harbor was not entirely closed to any vessels of war which might be sent to reinforce or supply the garrison of the fort. On the fourth of March there were provisions on hand for only about six weeks longer.

The Secretary of War, it will be remembered, had left it to Major Anderson to decide when the proper time should arrive for the Government to send supplies and reinforcements to his beleaguered command, and Anderson, as we have seen, feeling sure that any attempt of the kind would induce the enemy to attack him and thus bring on the civil war which he so much deprecated, had never requested either reinforcements or supplies. But he had on the last day of February asked the opinion of his officers on the possibility of reinforcing the post, and on the number of troops that would be required; and he had, on the same day, forwarded their replies, together with a statement of his own, to the Secretary of War.[1] His own estimate was that 20,000 men would be required for the task. In

this opinion several of his ofiicers concurred; the remainder put the number at a much lower figure. The plan suggested was to capture the enemy's works at Fort Moultrie, arid on Morris Island and Cumming's Point, which it was assumed would be defended

! Whether Anderson's estimates were furnished in obedience to a request of the Secretary, or of his own motion, does not appear.